80% may be too high of a threshold for amendments


I fear that 80% may be too high of a threshold for amending the governance system. I don’t have hard evidence for this, but my sense is that even a 2/3s voting threshold is very hard to achieve (it may not be hard to achieve in small groups or groups which are very collegial, but my sense is that it is hard to achieve in large groups which have polarized factions, which i believe is very common in large groups).

What supermajority thresholds do groups tend to use (for amendments but also for other supermajority thresholds)? The most common choice seems to be 2/3 (a little over 66%), which is found in, for example, Robert’s Rules, the US Constitution (although 2/3s is used for some things, US constitutional amendments must be ratified by 3/4 of the states), the German Basic Law, and elections in the Catholic Church. The next most common choice seems to be 3/5, which is found in, for example, the US Senate, the UN Security Countil, the South Korean National Assembly, the EU Commission.

A simple majority of shareholders can amend US Delaware corporations; in the UK and Germany, the threshold is 3/4 (in some cases these may be defaults that can themselves be modified by amendments) (Section 242(b)(i) of Delaware General Corporation Law ; UK Companies Act 2006 Sections 21 and 283 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/283 ; German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) Section 179 http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-147035.pdf).

Thresholds higher than 3/4 are so hard to meet that they are sometimes regarded as forms of approximate consensus.

For example, the Occupy Cincinnati group used a 90% threshold for ordinary decisions, and this was said to render making decisions “pretty much impossible” (Justin Jeffre, quoted in The Occupy Movement and the Poetics of the Oppressed by Ursula McTaggart), and some experienced activists believed that high supermajority thresholds led to the Occupy Cincinnati movement’s downfall (ibid).

The difference between 80% and 75%, or between 75% and 66.66…%, doesn’t seem so great, but the difficulty of meeting a high threshold is probably superlinear, for the similar reasons to the reasons that improving a web server from 99.9999% uptime to 99.99999% uptime is probably harder than getting it from 60% uptime to 61% uptime.

66.66…% (2/3s) may not sound high, but consider that if the threshold is 2/3s, then you are saying that we won’t amend until there are at least two people who want to amend for every one person who prefers the status quo.

Similarly, 75% (3/4th) is saying that we won’t amend until there are at least 3 people who want to amend for every 1 defender of the status quo, and 80% is saying that we demand 4 amendment supporters for every 1 status quo supporter. Seen in this light, an 80% threshold sounds like quite a lot. If there are three people who like an amendment for every one person who dislikes it, then do we really want to allow that one person to block the will of the other three?

I recommend a threshold of 2/3s.

Step by step setup of a Raspberry Pi 3 with Fedora linux-OS and Tezos

Lets make this clear.


THE 80% THRESHOLD SHOULD BE VOTED. This is the so called bold rule.

VOTE THE NUMBERS! And vote in a adaptive way, which means voters should be allowed to change their vote whenever they wish. So lets try it here:

What is your prefered threshold for amendments? (NOTE:You are allowed to change your vote in this demo poll whenever you wish, so it is wise to vote not what you actually believe, but taking into account other people’s votes.)

  • 90
  • 80
  • 70
  • 60
  • 50

0 voters

Step by step setup of a Raspberry Pi 3 with Fedora linux-OS and Tezos

You may also vote this, which is a prerequisite of the previous poll:

How an amendment wiil occur?

  • the amendment will happen in case a numerical threshold is bypassed. People should vote the number.
  • the amendment will happen in case a numerical threshold is bypassed. A clique should decide about this threashold.
  • the amendment will happen when the new idea (which is going to replace the old one) gets more votes. This certainly implies that all ideas are voted and there are no imposed ideas decided by a clique.
  • other

0 voters


It’s likely that you’re thinking it the DASH way, Tezos is going to do things differently.
Let’s wait and see what’s on the menu instead of speculating against the whitepaper


Who gets to vote?


So the question becomes:

  1. How many delegates
  2. What weight do those delegates wield

80% is achievable in DPoS, also know as popular-control for a reason.


To me voting is usually unnecessary. Some innovations are so obvious, simple and elegant that there is no need for a vote.
Other decisions may need dialog and assumption sharing allowing the choices to be tuned. And all of these activities need to be enclosed in an adjustable ethical corset. We have a duty of care here and are acting as models for others.


I dont think so.
Can you name an innovation of this type?


Requiring 80% percentage for amendment is a hoax.

It means that the clique actually decides. This 80% is a pretext of democracy. Especially in case the initial decisions were not required to be approved by the 80% of the votes, but were decided by the clique.

Furthermore, take also into account that initially the tezos coins belong to a few individuals, and as time passes the coins are distributed to more and more individuals. So in the future it will be even more impossible than today for this 80% to be reached.


I get why you say hoax and clique, let’s approach it sideways and see where we end up, okay?

First, I’m the odd one out, the reluctant delegate, the one you go too to get things done and out the door.
In other words, I’m a worker, not academia, not a desk jockey, but a person who has calluses.

So there’s that.

Fundamentally Tezos is quite a bit different than any other crypto, wouldn’t you agree?

Out of all the differentiators, the voting one is at heart the one that will easily capture individual attention, it has after all caught yours hasn’t it, as mine.

If it is all just a hoax then why continue to play this game?
Go and play a better one somewhere else, your time is valuable don’t waste any of it.

If you are still reading then something else is happening and I know what it is, you get that people everywhere are waking up.

Look beyond the business as the usual clique, the further out you look the more experiential evidence you will obtain, individuals are 100% in control.

I’m pointing out what I suspect you already know, you are in charge as we all are.

Tezos is worthless without us.

Tezos is worth a little less without you.

Sideways, stick around long enough to do some work, get your skin in the game, delegate yourself and vote, see how far you can go.


Tezos is definitely not a hoax. I may believe in tezos idea more than you. I may had the tezos idea in my mind even before everyone else here.

What I actually said is that the 80% percentage for amendments is a hoax number, and it should be reduced to a lower number.

What I strongly suggest is for the bold rule to be applied here in tezos. You cannot set 80% for amendments, if you cannot find 80% of the initial voters who agree with that number.

Have a look at my demo poll. Do 80% of the people agree to set 80% for amendment? I dont think so. Althought this is just a demo poll, it still shows the trends.


The wheel, cable ties, light bulbs


As I stated delegates vote not the people holding Tezos.
I can calculate the probabilities of achieving 80% once I know this:

  1. How many delegates
  2. What weight do those delegates wield

You can set 80% for amendments in a DPoS model, test it out yourself and see.


Even in that case the bold rule remains (although slightly changed):

You cannot set 80% for amendments, if you cannot find 80% of the initial delegates who agree with that number.

I am not a proponent of delegates.
I am a proponent of a proof of individuality.
So whatever you calculate for delegates, I think that delegates are not a good thing.
Because I dont think you can explain to me the reason why the delegates deserve to have their seat.


Please make the sure : Must all the tezos will jion in the vote ?If not ,then all the vote tezos (not all the tezos)agree 80% then threshold will be accept for amendments.I think it can work well in this 80%.


Yes, I believe that all the people who have tezos coins should join the vote, initially as INDIVIDUALS.

Then these individuals should decide whether they want to give more voting weight to some actors, either because these actors own many tezos coins, either because these actors are respectful, eiher because these actors are coders, either because these actors are active contributors/commentators/politiciens in the community, or for any other reason.

You may also give negative voting weights to individuals judged by the community to be spies or stupid (whether someone is stupid or spy can be proved in the history of the votes).

This is again a vote the numbers case, as long as the voting weight is a number.


Welcome to the fold, decouple voting from delegation part one.

Delegates run nodes, as a multi-node operator myself I do not want to capture votes as doing so forces me to become a politician.

The node operators primary concern should be with the network layer of the Tezos stack:

  • Security
  • Resiliency
  • Speed
  • Decentralization

Decouple voting from the delegation.

Once that is done eliminate the need to pick a delegate (node operator) altogether… that’s for another time.


May I ask you.
Why Sam, in case he decides to become his own bank, he cannot vote?


Cannot vote yet, Sam is taking an active role by converting debt, fiat currency, into non-debt which is a big start!


Cannot vote yet?
Which means that Sam (being his own bank) may vote oneday?
Under what conditions? Who is gonna alow him to vote?
Can sam be online, vote, then go off line?
Why the minimum delegation period is 3 months?
Is there a theory behind it, or it is just a random number?

And a second question. If you delegate your XTZ. this means that you cannot spend them, right?
Why you encourage people not to spend XTZ? You should encourage people to spend them instead.

And a third question. Why a static IP is required for delegating yourself?

Wow…I have a lot of questions. Maybe we should change thread and discuss your paper.


its not set at this point that a delegation is set in stone for a certain period. in alphanet, we can change it all willy-nilly as we see fit.

but there does need to be a set time where it will expire, in case evil delegators decide to not write certain operations